Having in mind the proposals of Michael McFaul about transition to democracy, what would happen in the the case of Venezuela if a transition was to happen.
7-February-2022
Sofía Barreto Ojeda
1. Who are the most important actors/groups we need to pay attention to in order to understand what is happening and will happen in Venezuela in terms of a possible transition to democracy, and on whose actions does the future of the Venezuelan political regime depend?
According to the lectures done throughout the course of Compared Political Systems, one can identify the following key actors:
Venezuela’s Government elites led by Nicolás Maduro It is very likely that Maduro’s right wing will reject any behavior that leads to the transition to democracy. Based on prior events, in this scenario one could see rather the modification of any independent mechanism to monitor elections, and the violation of civil rights and values through the promotion of media censorship and deployment of the military forces if considered necessary for supervision.
Constituent National Assembly (currently holds the legislative power and main driver of decision making) Enabled to create, modify or eliminate political and civil rights to satisfy interests that preserve the ideas of the current regime, the National Assembly can negotiate interests with the rising social or economic groups based on the government’s interests and benefits.
Venezuela’s Interine Government elites led by Juan Guaidó Since the head of the opposition is recognized by the international community, Juan Guaidó would lead foreign policy agreements to fasten the transition to democracy, however, within Venezuelan borders, his low popularity may jeopardize a successful transition to democracy. The National Assembly, (that according to the Constitution, the National Assembly belongs to the legislative power), will pursue the establishment of mechanisms towards the transition to democracy, allowing the monitoring of elections and freedom of press, which will encourage the citizens to hold the political power.
International allies of Venezuela’s Government (Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba) A transition to democracy would trigger destabilization in the diplomatic relationships between these countries and Venezuela, given that key sources of economic development would be at risk. International opponents of Venezuela’s Government (Colombia, USA, the EU). Western allies would support a transition to democracy by supporting the opposition, therefore promoting the creation of civil and political rights and transforming Venezuela’s political landscape by creating new diplomatic relationships.
International opponents of Venezuela’s Government (Colombia, USA, the EU) Western allies would support a transition to democracy by supporting the opposition, therefore promoting the creation of civil and political rights and transforming Venezuela’s political landscape by creating new diplomatic relationships.
Michael McFaul identifies seven factors that contributed to transitions to democracy in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). Review that reading and your notes from the class in which we discussed it. In dialogue with McFaul’s proposal, and today’s readings, please answer: Are you optimistic or pessimistic that we will see a transition to democracy in Venezuela within the next two years (meaning, that the next presidential elections in Venezuela will be free and fair) and why?
In general, this team found that there are not many reasons to be optimistic about democratization in Venezuela.
Three years ago, the self-declaration of Juan Guiado as interim president, seemed to be an opportunity to start a democratization process in Venezuela. First, he gathered all the opposition forces represented in the National Assembly. As it occurred in Poland and Czech Republic, a united opposition, or at least the feeling of one, played a critical role in the democratization process (referencia). Before Juan Guaidó’s self-declaration, several other leaders from the opposition had emerged, but political fragmentation was evident and leaders did not reach enough popularity. Since the rise of the regime, first led by Hugo Chavez and then continued by Nicolas Maduro, opposition forces in Venezuela have covered a broad political spectrum (referencia), with no clarity on which of the opposition leaders could drive and be at the head front of a political confrontation with the installed regime. Hence, despite the existence of leaders in the opposition, their involvement in political activities were never widely supported by Venezuelan citizens.
Another factor that could have been interpreted as a sign of hope for democratization was a series of messages issued by Guaido’s and intended to the regime elites. In several public statements he attempted to persuade generals, soldiers and civil servants to betray Maduro (referencia). At that moment it was not clear if officials from the public office in Venezuela’s Government were totally loyal to the incumbent. Some dictatorships have shown that military support is a key factor to maintain or change a regime.
In addition to Guiado’s messages, we should consider the mass mobilizations that took place during the first days of the interim government. At the time, such massive social protest also arose as a small possibility to suffocate the installed regime. Given the dynamic triggered by Guiadó, the rapid international awareness and recognition of his new representation of the Venezuelan Government drew a probability to overthrow Maduro’s regime. After receiving formal recognition of legitimacy by some western countries, Guiado’s interim government enabled Venezuela’s access to international monetary funds (referencia). However, it was not clear if with such international pressure a negotiation between Maduro and the opposition could be managed.
Today, three years later, Guaidó’s power has slowly vanished, and it seems there is no other leadership capable of confronting Maduro’s power. Senior military officers have emphatically taken a stand with the dictator since he guarantees privileges and massive sources of income (referencia). An example of this situation can be seen in the control that military members and high ranks figures have over gold mines and drug trafficking networks in Venezuela (referencia). On the one hand, and given this lucrative escenario, Guaidó’s leadership can be seen as poorly persuasive. In fact, almost all military members have remained loyal to the current regime. On the other hand, the social protest was not large enough to trigger a transition to democracy, and international support did not seem to have a practical effect or significant changes in the political landscape. For example, one of the plans for international pressure that did not achieve the expected outcome, was the strategy named by the Colombian Government as “the diplomatic blockade” (referencia), which despite recognising Guiado as interim president and had the intention to support a democracy, did not have political means to interfere in the transition to a democracy.
Guaidó, although recognized by the international community, has no political power and instead, most of the state’s functions remain in Maduro’s hands. Even countries considered as the greatest allies of the interim government started to nuance their position (referencia). It is not the first time a regime without international recognition conserves power in a country. The best example is the Comunist Government in China, which remained in power even without the United Nations (UN) recognition. Until 1970, the Nationalist Government of Taipei occupied China’s seat in the UN Assembly and the UN Security Council, despite having control over Taiwan, some small islands around, and the Penghu archipelago (referencia). During many years the de facto’s Government of the most populous country survived without international recognition (reference). Sanctions, another main weapon used by international opponents of Venezuela’s Government, have seemed to be highly ineffective. Additionally, given the economic recession Venezuela has been in since 2014 (referencia), a democratization process is unlikely (referencia).
Another visible con towards the democratization process in Venezuela is the absence of massive oppressive mechanisms of surveillance like other autocratic regimes do, since it does not have the sources to maintain them. Nonetheless, Venezuela’s government has shown it will hold legal proceedings against recognized public figures and institutions in order to censor and silence the media. Armando.info is one of the numerous cases that have been silenced by censorship for sharing information (referencia).
However, not everything is bad news. Although not in large, Venezuela has also shown some factors that can be considered positive for democratization processes. In the first place, Maduro is not appreciated as much as his predecessor Hugo Chavez. One can say Maduro’s popularity is declining since his sympathizers grow smaller as time passes by. This may be the result of his lack of charisma, but also of bad luck. Additionally, the high oil prices allowed Chavez to finance numerous social programs, but when Muduro took power the prices also went downhill. (referencia), forcing Maduro to cut the national budget. Another factor seen in Venezuela is the nature of the political regime. On paper, Venezuela is a democracy. There are fraudulent elections, but there are still elections. Meaning that, in a hypothetical transition to democracy it won’t be necessary to create institutions since they already exist. In fact, there is an antecedent of elections lost by Maduro. In 2015 an opposition coalition won the parliamentary elections (referencia). It is true the Supreme Court, influenced by Maduro, stripped the elected Assembly from its powers, but that antecedent shows that it is possible to defeat the establishment in an electoral process.
Overall, Venezuela does not seem to have many reasons to be optimistic about a possible transition to democracy in the near future. The autocratic values and characteristics are prevalent over the ones a democracy holds. Since the legislative elections held in 2015, Guaido’s possession as interim President in 2019, and his ever since decay, Maduro has tried to protect his power. Throughout institutions he has tried holding the power around him. So, from this, it can be said Maduro’s government elites will find a way to maintain his power and the institutions to remain unharmed for the next elections and the near future.
This analysis was elaborated during the course of Sistemas Politicos Comparados.
